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ABSTRACT 
 
FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION AND REFORMS IN PAKISTAN 
AND KOREA  
 
 
By 
 
 
Mirza Khalid Amin 
 
 
Financial liberalization has been the cornerstone of financial and economic reforms. This 
study starts with introduction to financial liberalization, its impact, preconditions and 
procedure in light of literature, which emphasizes that it should be carried out keeping in 
view the socio-economic and political structure of the country. Then it discusses the 
partial financial and economic policy reforms towards financial liberalization adopted in 
Pakistan particularly during the period 1999-2006 after brief overview of economic 
development and impact of financial liberalization.  The next chapter explains the 
evolution of financial system in Korea with focus on financial liberalization policies and 
their evaluation. The last chapter gives comparison of the economies of the two countries 
and the financial liberalization policies and brings out the salient differences between 
steps taken by these two countries towards financial liberalization. Finally, it concludes 
that Pakistan lacked in many social, economic and political factors such as literacy rate, 
skilled human resources, per capita income, incessant democratic governments and its 
image as a stable, safe country for investment as compared to Korea. The policy of 
market based system can bring economic uplift to the country provided the prerequisites 
for its implementation are fulfilled which take time. Pakistan is facing many difficult 
challenges and will continue to face new unforeseen challenges and has no room for 
complacency. The worldwide preoccupation with the large economies of China and India 
and the ever-increasing quest to enter these markets is also working to the disadvantage 
of countries such as Pakistan. But the lesson we have learned is that there is no point in 
complaining and whining about this but to get on with the job, to work even harder, to 
overcome these deficiencies and constraints and to hope for the best. 
 
 
 
 ii
 
 
Copyright by 
Mirza Khalid Amin 
2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii
 
 
 
 
Dedicated to my son Hamayun Abdullah Amin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
I am indebted to my supervisor Professor Kun-Ho Lee for his guidance, time, 
encouragement and tolerance throughout the course of this work. I am also thankful to 
“POSCO TJ Park Foundation” for providing financial support which enabled me to 
complete this course. Many thanks go to Dr. Muhammad Amin with whom I had many 
useful discussions about the subject and he helped me in various ways. I am also thankful 
and indebted to Ms Jungwoo Park for devoted and sincere cooperation during my stay at 
KDI SCHOOL. Last but not least, thanks are also due to my family, my mother, brothers, 
sisters and my wife for their continued patience, support and encouragement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v
Table of Contents 
1 A SURVEY OF LITERATURE ON FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION ............ 1 
1.1 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................. 1 
1.2 FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION AND VARIOUS MACROECONOMIC 
INDICATORS................................................................................................................ 2 
1.2.1 FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION AND INVESTMENT ........................ 3 
1.2.2 FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION & SAVINGS ...................................... 4 
1.3 FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION & FINACIAL CRISES............................. 5 
1.3.1 ASIAN CRISIS EXPERIENCE................................................................... 8 
1.4 HOW TO PURSUE FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION?............................... 10 
         1.4.1     MACROECONOMIC PRECONDITIONS ........................................... 11 
1.4.2 INSTITUTIONAL PRECONDITIONS.................................................... 12 
1.5 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 13 
2 FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION AND REFORMS IN   PAKISTAN ............. 15 
2.1 PAKISTAN’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN OVERVIEW .............. 15 
2.2 FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION IN PAKISTAN ........................................ 20 
2.2.1 FINANCIAL DEEPENING ....................................................................... 20 
2.2.2 SAVINGS, INVESTMENT & GROWTH................................................ 22 
2.3 FINACIAL REFORMS & POLICY MEASURES BY THE PRESENT 
GOVERNMENT.......................................................................................................... 24 
2.3.1 DEBT RESTRUCTURING ....................................................................... 24 
2.3.2 FISCAL AND TAX REFORMS................................................................ 24 
2.3.3 PRIVATIZATION AND FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORMS .............. 25 
 vi
2.3.4 TRADE LIBERLIZATION AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT .............. 25 
2.3.5 GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS.......................... 26 
2.4 FINANCIAL REFORMS & POLICY OUTCOMES...................................... 27 
2.4.1 DEBT RESTRUCTURING ....................................................................... 27 
2.4.2 FISCAL AND TAX REFORMS................................................................ 28 
2.4.3 PRIVATIZATION AND FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORMS .............. 28 
2.4.4 TRADE LIBERLIZATION AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT .............. 30 
2.4.5 GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS.......................... 31 
2.5 FINANCIAL REFORMS & POLICY EVALUATION.................................. 32 
2.6 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 35 
3 EVOLUTION OF KOREAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM ......................................... 36 
3.1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW ............................................................................. 39 
3.1.1 BEGINNING IN THE 1960S ..................................................................... 39 
3.1.2 SHIFT TO CAPITAL-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES ................................ 40 
3.1.3 STABILITY TO CRISES .......................................................................... 41 
3.2 FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION, CRISIS AND REVIVAL IN KOREA.. 44 
3.2.1 FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION............................................................ 44 
3.2.2 FINANCIAL CRISIS 1997-98 & ITS CAUSES....................................... 49 
3.2.3 FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION – AN ANALYSIS............................. 50 
3.2.4 REVIVAL AND POST CRISES REFORMS .......................................... 52 
3.3 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 54 
4 COMPARISON AND CONCLUSIONS ................................................................ 55 
4.1 COMPARISON OF ECONOMY...................................................................... 56 
 vii
4.2 COMPARISON-FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION ...................................... 58 
4.3 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................. 62 
References........................................................................................................................ 66 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 viii
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
1. Table 2.1 Indicators of Financial and Capital  
Market Depth in Pakistan       21  
2. Table 2.2 GDP & Sector Growth Rates     27 
3. Table 2.3 Fiscal Policy Indicators      29 
4. Table 2.4 Money & Credit and Stock Market    30 
5. Table 2.5 Balance of Payments (Growth Rates %)    31 
6. Table2.6a Social Development Indicators     34 
7. Table 2.6b Human Resource Indicators     34 
8. Table 3.1 Bird’s Eye View of Korean Economy (1962-2005)  38 
9. Table 4.1 Comparison of Economy of Pakistan & Korea   58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
Chapter 1  
1 A SURVEY OF LITERATURE ON 
FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION  
1.1  INTRODUCTION  
 
The essence of financial liberalization hypothesis is that domestic financial 
markets should determine a country's interest rates.  Positive real interest rates discourage 
capital flight and increase savings. Financial liberalization is aimed at establishing market 
based free economy to achieve consistent and stable economic growth through efficient 
and optimal use of resources. 
In 1973, McKinnon and Shaw wrote their seminal work on the impact of financial 
liberalization. They argued that an economy that holds the interest rate below the market 
clearing value will generate less than optimal savings, thereby detracting from the pool 
available for investment. A smaller proportion of savings will be channeled through the 
formal financial system, presumably resulting in a less efficient allocation of investment. 
In addition, the low interest rate will make low yielding projects profitable and given a 
degree of randomness in banks lending decisions, there will be many low yielding 
investments that will serve to reduce the average rate of return on investment.  
Sufficient experience has now been accumulated to permit a reasonably confident 
verdict about the consequence of financial liberalization which shows that the beneficial 
effects of liberalization i.e. better allocation of investment as anticipated by McKinnon 
and Shaw is typically realizable. In the simple model of credit being rationed by price to 
those who bid the highest is inappropriate in the case of the financial sector. Those who 
 2
are prepared to bid the highest are typically those with the riskiest projects, and a prudent 
banker has to search for a borrower that offers the best risk-return combination rather 
than one who offers the highest interest rates. Therefore he is not given an incentive to 
lend to the safest borrowers almost regardless of the expected rate of return.  This does 
lead to a better pattern of investment. The anticipated benefit that seems to be absent is 
the impact of financial liberalization on savings, at least once the real rate is positive.  
1.2 FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION AND 
VARIOUS MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS: 
 
There are several differing views on what exactly has been the effect on various 
macroeconomic variables. Several studies conclude that financial development 
contributes positively to economic growth. Using cross-country analysis, Robert King 
and Ross Levine (1993) find a significant, robust and positive correlation between higher 
levels of financial development and faster growth, physical capital accumulation and 
economic efficiency. Alan Gelb (1989) finds a positive correlation between the real 
interest rate and growth for 34 countries for the period 1965-85. Jose De Gregorio and 
Pablo Guidotti (1992) find a positive relationship between credit to the private sector and 
growth for a sample of 98 countries, for 1960-85. However, their regressions for 12 Latin 
American countries for the period 1950-85 find that credit had a significantly negative 
correlation with growth. The correlation was not significant in the 1950s and 1960s but 
became strongly negative in the 1970s and 1980s.  
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1.2.1 FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION AND INVESTMENT 
 
Joshua Greene and Delano Vilenueva (1991) find a negative and significant effect 
of real interest rates on investment. Using 23 developing countries, for the period 1975-
87 Alan Gelb (1989) finds a positive though weak relationship between aggregate 
investment and interest rates. Panicos Demetriades and Michael Devereux (1992) with a 
sample of 63 developing countries and a data spanning from 1961 to 1990, find that the 
effect of higher interest rates is stronger on the cost of capital than the effect on enhanced 
supply of investible funds. Thus higher interest rates went on to diminish investment.  
In the literature, which argues a positive relationship between financial sector 
development and economic growth, majority agree to the fact that the growth stems from 
increased efficiency in allocation of investment rather than a larger volume of investment. 
Theoretical studies such as those by Jeremy Greenwood and Boyan Jovanovic (1989), 
Valerie Bencivenga and Giles Saint Paul (1992) estimate that some 75% of the positive 
correlation between financial intermediation and economic growth is due to increased 
investment efficiency rather than an increased volume of investment. Alan Gelb (1989) 
also finds that most of the positive association between real interest rates and growth 
stemmed from the efficiency effect rather than the level of investment.  
Jacques Morisset (1993) finds that although the effect of financial liberalization 
on the quantity of investment was weak, but was consistently positive on its quality. 
Gregorio and Guidotti (1992) find that credit to the private sector was negatively related 
to growth in the 1970s and 1980s. They attribute this negative correlation to inefficient 
lending by banks in light of poor regulatory incentives. 
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1.2.2 FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION & SAVINGS 
 
Maxwell Fry (1978, 1980 and 1995) in his various articles finds that, across a 
sample of 14 Asian developing countries gross national saving rate is positively affected 
by increases in real interest rates. However, Giovannini (1983, 1985) points out that the 
findings of Maxwell Fry were not robust to the changes in time or region. Fry (1995) 
himself conceded that the effect is small and diminishes in the more recent years and is 
prevalent mostly in Asia. A large number of studies point out that the high level of saving 
in Japan and other East Asian countries was not because of high interest rates but 
expansion of banks into rural areas and the availability of low yielding but safe deposit 
instrument.  
Thus most of the literature on interest elasticity of savings concludes that a low 
positive interest rate is ideal to maximize savings. The question that arises then is 
whether the financial liberalization has been able to produce such interest rates. Most of 
the countries have moved away from negative interest rates after liberalization but some 
moved quickly to interest rates that were not only positive but very high in real terms. 
Following deregulation, Australia, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Taiwan, Thailand and 
US, all experienced sharp increases in interest rates. There were some countries where 
the interest rates have fallen like Israel, Italy and United Kingdom. In Hong Kong and 
Singapore, which have had liberalized financial sectors, real interest rates have in general 
been positive and moderate in real terms.  
The impact of financial deregulation on financial deepening has also been looked 
into some depth by various economists. Dimitri Margaritis, Dean Hyslop, and David Rae 
(1994) present econometric evidence for New Zealand, showing that financial 
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liberalization is positively related to the growth of M3 to GDP. The ratio of M2 to GDP 
showed an increase in several developing countries like Argentina, Brazil, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Malaysia etc. However, it also showed a decline following 
liberalization in Colombia, Venezuela, Philippines and Turkey.  
The literature on correlation between financial liberalization and savings is again 
ambiguous with contradictory evidence. Nureldin Hussain (1996) calculates that, in the 
three years following liberalization, financial savings in Egypt increased on average by 
6% of GDP over the level that would have occurred in the absence of financial 
liberalization. On the other hand Tamim Bayomi (1993) estimates that financial 
deregulation in the United Kingdom resulted in a decline in the personal saving ratio of 
2.3 percentage points over the 1980s. Simon Chapple (1991) finds that both household 
and corporate saving has fallen since liberalization in New Zealand. In the United States, 
the savings rate has fallen steadily since deregulation in the 1980s. There is also evidence 
of lower savings rate following liberalization in Argentina, Colombia and Philippines.  
There have been several cases where financial liberalization has led to a 
consumption boom. Three separate studies by Lopez-Meija, (1991), Bayomi (1993) and 
Darby and Ireland (1994) show that financial liberalization resulted in consumption boom 
in the United Kingdom in the late 1980s. Similarly Mexico and Thailand experienced 
large increases in consumer lending after financial liberalization.  
1.3 FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION & FINACIAL 
CRISES 
 
Finally a review of the literature on financial sector would be incomplete without 
looking at the vast literature devoted to deregulation and financial crises. The fear that 
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financial liberalization was destined to breed crisis was first given wide currency by 
Carlos Diaz Alejandro’s 1985 paper “Good Bye Financial Liberalization, Hello Financial 
Crash”. Williamson and Mahar (1998) take up a panel of 34 countries, both developed 
and developing, and show that almost all the 34 economies experienced some form of 
systematic financial crisis between the beginning of 1980s and July 1997, and several 
suffered new and severe crisis later that year. It is probably true that not all crises were 
direct consequences of financial liberalization. In particular it seems likely that in a 
number of cases, banks had already a share of large number of non-performing loans at 
the time liberalization occurred as a result of previous directed lending, and that 
liberalization simply exposed portfolio weakness that had been previously hidden. 
Nevertheless financial liberalization was at least a contributory factor in many cases. 
Certainly, Argentina (1980), Chile, Mexico (1994), Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, United 
States, and Venezuela are cases in point. The costs of these crises have run into billions 
of dollars.  
Carmen Reinhart and Graciela Kaminsky (1996) use cross country profit 
estimations to detect causality between banking crises, balance of payment crises, and 
financial liberalization. Their results indicate that, although banking crises tend to 
precipitate balance of payments crises, the reverse is not always true. Importantly, they 
find that financial sector liberalization is positively and significantly related to 
subsequent banking crisis. Asli Demirigüc-Kunt and Enrica Detragiache (1997), in a 
study that covers 65 countries from 1980 to 1994, use a number of macroeconomic and 
institutional variables to determine the probability of banking crisis. They use three 
separate variables, real interest rate, share of credit to private sector and growth in credit. 
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Although all three variables are positively and significantly related to the probability of a 
banking crisis occurring, the study neither lays out a macroeconomic model capturing the 
interaction of these and other macroeconomic variable, nor attempts to incorporate the 
extent of prudential regulation and supervision in the financial sector into the analysis. In 
addition, the interest rate, credit to private sector, and growth in credit are influenced by a 
host of other factors than financial liberalization. 
Patrick Honohan (1997) alleges that the causes of banking crises span a wide 
spectrum. He divides banking crises into three syndromes, macroeconomic epidemics, 
microeconomic deficiencies and endemic crises in a government protected system. The 
latter two categories describe the underdeveloped and government managed financial 
system, typically found in a financially repressed economy. However, Honohan does not 
blame either repression or liberalization for the spate of banking crises. He blames the 
change of regime, which altered the nature, scale, frequency and correlation pattern of 
shocks to the economic and financial system, increasing the riskiness of traditional 
behavior, or introducing new and inexperienced players. Looking back on a number of 
developing country cases, Honohan defines the types of regime changes as financial 
repression, financial liberalization, structural transformation, political developments, 
privatization, and technological innovation and globalization in finance. Of these, 
financial liberalization, structural transformation, privatization and technological 
innovation and globalization often result from the financial reform process.  
Michael Gavin and Ricardo Hausmann (1990) see the origin of banking crisis as 
residing in a credit boom that allows almost any borrower to service its debt by 
borrowing from another source. This deprives the lender from the information that would 
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have helped him to differentiate between sound and risky borrowers. In a macroeconomic 
crisis, continued debt servicing becomes problematic, and many borrowers default on 
their loans. This has been seen following the financial liberalization in the Chile, Mexico, 
and Thailand. After liberalization, both Argentina and Turkey experienced widespread 
distress borrowing because of a vicious circle of unsustainably high interest rates at banks 
to cover growing numbers of nonperforming loans and a further distress borrowing by the 
corporate sector.  
Gerard Caprio, Berry Wilson and Anthony Sanders (1997) present evidence that a 
rapid expansion of lending to consumers was a leading factor behind the collapse of 
banks in Mexico in 1994. Among many factors which contributed to this collapse were 
inadequate supervision, lack of proper incentives and existence of broad deposit 
insurance factors that limited the need for bankers to diversify risks in newly liberalized 
environment. These studies suggest that financial sector vulnerability frequently develops 
after liberalization, even though it can be argued that the root cause of the weak banks 
was the preceding financial repression.  
1.3.1 ASIAN CRISIS EXPERIENCE  
 
The Asian crisis was the result of “weak” domestic financial systems in volatile 
international capital movements owing to globalization of financial markets (Dean 1998, 
Goldstein 1998, Montes 1998, Radelet and Sachs 1998). The Asian economies (affected 
badly by the crisis of 1997–98) were victims of this naive notion about free capital 
movement without realizing that a sound and strong financial system was the pre-
requisite. Adequate regulation, banking supervision, accounting standards, financial 
transparency, legal protection and accountability in corporate governance along with  
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pervasive market perfections free from government interventions in business, and merit 
based credit allocation are essential for effective financial liberalization and absence of 
these all led to a high proportion of “bad loans” and “bad investments.”  
According to Wade and Veneroso (1998) & Kumar and Debroy (1999), financial 
liberalization in Asia was an inappropriate policy that only weakened a relationship based 
system and government’s monitoring and supportive role (that had served the region’s 
economies well by mobilizing and allocating savings/resources efficiently to productive 
investments) in an effort to restructure it in the fashion of the Anglo-American system 
resulting in over-expansion of firms beyond their capacity which became the root cause 
of the crisis which essentially represents a case of market failure and not of government 
failure. Hellman, Murdock, and Stiglitz (1997) argue that the standard financial 
liberalization policy is based on a naive acceptance of neoclassical laissez-faire ideas and 
is, therefore, inappropriate for many developing countries rather the right financial 
regime for the developing countries is “financial restraint”.  
  According to Camdessus MD of the IMF (1998), Masuyama (1999) and Radelett 
and Sachs (1998), inappropriate or “disorderly, haphazard and partial” manner of 
financial liberalization under pressure without addressing the proper phasing and 
sequencing of capital account liberalization weakened the Asian financial system and 
exposed the vulnerable economies to a rapid reversal of international capital flows. 
Following Stiglitz’s analysis, we can infer financial liberalization in Asia might have 
failed to deliver the goods because of: firstly financial liberalization might have been 
misunderstood as a simple mirror image of financial repression (Kaul 1999) and regarded 
merely as deregulation of interest rates, privatization of state-owned financial institutions 
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and promotion of competition in financial markets, elimination of directed credit, and 
removal of foreign exchange controls and secondly even if the blueprint for reform was a 
correct one, its implementation might have strayed from its true course because of the 
pressures of various interest groups. For instance, according to Park (1998), the Western 
governments pressured the developing countries to open their capital markets for foreign 
investment although they were aware that the accounting practices and disclosure 
requirements in the developing countries did not conform to the accepted standards and 
that the supervisory authorities in those countries did not enforce rules and regulations as 
tightly as they should. 
1.4 HOW TO PURSUE FINANCIAL 
LIBERALIZATION?   
 
 The first real-life test of the McKinnon-Shaw (1973) thesis of interest rate 
deregulation was southern cone experiment when Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay 
implemented financial liberalization policies in the late 1970s which led to skyrocketing 
interest rate, bankruptcy of many solvent firms, and an eventual financial crisis in 1982. 
This failure of financial liberalization is attributed to unsuited macroeconomic 
environment by the researchers like McKinnon (1988: 387–88) who considers 
macroeconomic stability and sound regulatory framework as preconditions for successful 
financial liberalization which he thought, was difficult  to create in the developing 
countries where human capital and knowledgeable auditors or supervisors were in short 
supply.  
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1.4.1 MACROECONOMIC PRECONDITIONS 
 
 According to McKinnon (1991), for successful financial liberalization, the 
following steps are essential:- 
• The first step is the establishment of an appropriate macroeconomic policy, 
which includes fiscal control, balancing the government budget, 
privatizing state-owned enterprises, and ensures an adequate internal 
revenue service for the purpose of tax collection.  
• The second step is the liberalization of domestic financial markets by 
allowing interest rates to be determined freely by the market, freeing up 
onerous reserve requirements, and privatizing the banks. This step also 
includes the establishment of commercial law and the liberalization of 
domestic trade.  
• The third step is the liberalization of foreign exchange, which includes the 
liberalization of the exchange rate for current account transactions and that 
of tariffs, quotas, and other international trade restrictions.  
• In the final step, international capital flows are to be liberalized.  
 
According to Stiglitz (1989), market failure is an inherent characteristic of financial 
markets. Financial liberalization may lead to an inefficient allocation of financial 
resources (Cho 1986) in developing countries due to credit-rationing by banks and 
lack of well-functioning equity market. The use of the equity market for raising 
funds is more limited in developing than in developed countries because the former 
generally have a less developed equity market than the latter and are subject to 
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greater uncertainty, particularly where the political system is unstable. Furthermore, 
the small firms have inefficient capital allocation among their sub-units and imply 
greater difficulty in collecting, evaluating, and disseminating information, which 
poses problems for financial intermediaries. Even when firms are large, the relative 
weakness of regulatory institutions impedes full disclosure and adequate provision of 
information to the market.   
1.4.2 INSTITUTIONAL PRECONDITIONS   
 
The institutions necessary for a market economy must be purposefully created 
prior to financial liberalization (Akyüz 1993, Villanueva and Mirakhor 1990, Caprio et al. 
1994, Gertler and Rose 1996, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1998, Drees and 
Pazarbasioglu 1998, and Sikorski 1996). The developing countries do not have the 
institutions necessary for free-market policy and, furthermore, those institutions do not 
get established quickly and spontaneously, therefore adopting free market policy in short 
period is not possible.  
Which strategy and sequencing a country adopts in reforming its financial system, 
moreover, depends on its initial conditions and the speed of institution building. As a 
matter of fact, another World Bank study on financial reform concludes that, 
“…recommendations for any country’s financial system need to be ‘tuned’ to the 
institutions and culture of the country” (Caprio and Vittas 1997: 3).  
According to Caprio (1994), the outcome of financial reform depends:- 
• Firstly on the overall net worth of banks and the initial mix of their assets 
at the time of reform.  
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• Secondly on the initial stock of human capital as bankers need to have 
skills in risk assessment and the ability to gather information about new 
potential credit, if they are to make correct loan decisions. 
• Thirdly on the initial stock of information capital, which in turn depends 
on the existence of audited financial statements, developed equity markets, 
and the level of acquisition of public and client-specific information.  
• The fourth requirement for successful financial reform is the existence of a 
system of rules and procedures for the implementation of decisions within 
banks.  
As pointed out by Caprio (1994: 61), these requirements cannot be implemented 
overnight as their development requires time and diligence. A developing country will 
have to develop its own financial system keeping in view its political, economic, 
sociological, legal and institutional conditions in the development of its financial system.  
1.5 CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion one finds that financial sector liberalization has occurred in a wide 
range of countries since 1973. Almost all developing countries have now at least partially 
liberalized their financial sector. The process has varied greatly; both in terms of speed 
and sequencing. The evidence suggests that financial liberalization has yielded positive 
results in terms of greater financial depth and increased efficiency in the allocation of 
investment but it has not brought the boost in the savings as was predicted by McKinnon 
and Shaw. It also suggests that a positive, but modest, real interest rate would be most 
conducive to secure a high rate of saving. This rate of saving is also an optimum from the 
view point of avoiding financial crisis. The danger that liberalization will lead to such a 
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crisis is the most important drawback in the entire process, the other drawback being a 
loss of monetary control. 
Also the research on financial liberalization and the Asian crisis makes it clear that 
financial liberalization needs to have macroeconomic & institutional preconditions and be 
tuned, as argued by Caprio and Vittas (1997), to the institutions and culture of the 
country if it is to be successful in creating a well-functioning market-based financial 
system.  
The purpose of any reform is to ensure economic stability and then sustainable 
economic growth. No doubt, market based financial system can do it most efficiently, but 
that is the case only when there are no market failures. Financial deregulation/ 
liberalization, does not by itself bring about a stable and efficient market-based financial 
system, when it is carried out without a coherent strategy, and without institutions and 
financial market infrastructure necessary to guard against the market failures (which 
replace the Governments’ role against the market failures).  
Thus, before any country decides to undertake financial liberalization, it must 
ensure if it is correct policy for it to adopt in lieu of its economic, social, cultural and 
institutional conditions and if so, it must be carried out prudently according to the policy 
blueprint and in proper sequenced manner. 
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Chapter 2  
 
2 FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION AND 
REFORMS IN   PAKISTAN 
 
  Pakistan was on the verge of default in May 1998 and had been put in selective 
default category by S&P and Moody’s (In short, primarily due to political instability, 
inconsistent economic policies, lack of common vision and leadership and national & 
international issues like two wars with India, Afghan War, Gulf War etc). So, it was the 
need of the time to formulate a strategy, not only to improve the situation but also to 
ensure stability and sustainable economic growth. In December 1999, the present 
Government formulated and started implementing policy to achieve macroeconomic 
stabilization through fundamental structural reforms and improved governance which 
they believed would lead to sustainable growth and poverty reduction. The purpose was 
not just the crisis management or pursuing simply stabilization (as these were short term 
objectives) but to ensure long term stability and a platform for economic take off. Before 
looking into the Financial Reforms & Policy measures, their outcome and evaluation let’s 
have an overview of Pakistan’s economic development and impact of financial 
liberalization in Pakistan.  
2.1 PAKISTAN’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 
AN OVERVIEW 
Pakistan experienced persistent uneven development ever since the country was 
established in 1947. The first few years were the most difficult ones, given the violence 
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and the refugee problems. Its economic performance was very poor in the first decade. 
The 1960s witnessed a sharp favorable as growth approached 6 percent and since then the 
country has experienced fair economic growth, though with cyclical downturns. Average 
annual real GDP growth rates were 6.8% in the Sixties, 4.8% in the Seventies, and 6.5% 
in the Eighties which fell to 4.6% in the Nineties, with significantly lower growth in the 
second half of that decade. Growth trend was maintained at 5-6 percent per annum until 
mid-1990s. The major reasons for cyclical growth (fluctuating) were endemic political 
instability and huge defense expenditure for strategic & security reasons (essentially to 
regain a disputed land over which India and Pakistan had fought seven small/big wars). 
War-mongering is part of the political culture that slowly evolved to justify the huge 
resource mobilization for these wars: all political parties had to subscribe to war, and that 
is a major handicap for this country. Another main obstacle to development is the high 
population of 160 million growing at 2.7 percent per annum, which is considered to be 
one of the highest in developing countries. Even Bangladesh has reduced birth rate below 
this level.   
Pakistan has traditionally a mixed economy. Pakistan kept the traded sector quite 
open, though the domestic sector had pervasive price distortions. The traded sector was 
relatively liberalized. The financial sector had all forms of controls to support a system of 
subsidies for agriculture and industries. The outcome was a lack of fiscal discipline, and 
the public services fostered (thus diminishing economy’s ability to grow) endemic 
inefficiencies in the process of intervening in the market pricing process. Educational, 
social and health services were considered least important for budgetary allocation.  
Although the trade sector was liberalized at an early stage but the capital and current 
 17
accounts were closed along with stringent financial suppression that distorted domestic 
prices, made perverse by subsidies. The country had neither a capital nor an industrial 
base at the time of its birth in 1947. Obviously, the basic focus then was on agriculture 
and agro-based industries. The 1960’s witnessed the Green Revolution, when resources 
were applied to increase per capita outputs. Shortage of natural resources, especially 
irrigation water, required spending huge amounts of domestic resources as well as foreign 
aid loans to introduce a canal irrigation system as a backbone for agricultural output 
required to feed a growing population. These efforts resulted in reduced dependence on 
food imports, especially wheat, and increased export earnings from cash crops such as 
cotton, rice, jute and sugar cane.  
Only after this foundation in agriculture was laid in the 1960s, that private sector 
became interested in manufacturing industries such as textile, cement, fertilizer, etc.  
Meanwhile, investment was made in the services sector, to build infrastructure in banks 
and financial institutions, educational institutions and health facilities. The public sector, 
however, could not accelerate investment in these sectors as a large proportion of 
domestic resources were allocated for defense in a period of rule by generals. Despite that, 
some industrial sector development did occur in textile and agro-based industries.  
During the next four decades, Pakistan experienced complete political instability with 
military regime takeover five times. All efforts of any economic planning proved to be 
unsuccessful due to political instability and border issues with neighboring India, which 
included seven direct or indirect border clashes.  The collapse of the Eastern wing of the 
country (now Bangladesh) in December 1971 was a further blow to economic prosperity.  
The nationalization drive in 1972-75 reversed the process of any private sector 
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participation in economic development. Until 1980, distortions such as subsidized 
agriculture and industrial activities were the norm. By any stretch of imagination, this 
was not pro-growth, nor did it result in the market mechanism to work unhindered on the 
prices in the different sectors.  During 1984-90, the authorities became desperate and 
could only do one thing, which is to reduce and eventually eliminate these subsidies. In 
these reforms, IMF structural stabilization program and the USAID economic aid 
package did what the political elites failed to do for quite a long while.1  Later, the 
Russian occupation of Afghanistan which left Pakistan with no option but to become a 
direct partner to the US-led coalition war brought a culture of drugs, ammunition, and 
terrorist activities in the country diverting the resources from economic planning to 
internal security concerns during the regime of General Zia.  
Besides political instability, many economic factors were responsible for this 
decline in growth in 1990s. These include financial resource limitation, persistent fiscal 
imbalances, inadequate infrastructure, declining export demand, declining foreign 
reserves and soaring international debt.  
In 1990, a major package of economic reforms was introduced. It had a wider 
focus on many development issues; exchange rate and payment reforms, privatization, 
trade deregulation and financial sector reforms. This was supposedly a more serious 
attempt at reforms than the reform in the 1980s. However, a lack of political consensus 
built to implement these policies, high level of corruption and political instability could 
not help the economy to grow. The result was just a meager progress that did not solve 
the many problems of a young new country founded on a vision to give its people more 
                                                          
1 During 1982-88, Pakistan was the second largest recipient of economic aid from the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID).  
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prosperity.  
Timely assistance from IMF helped the country to avoid the worst scenario. The 
revival of economic reforms was expected soon to take centre place and the government 
focused on these reforms as its main agenda. Some drastic measures were also announced 
including reforms in tax collection system, downsizing the government and incentives to 
attract foreign capital both from foreigners and nationals living abroad. To these were 
added a wide range of reforms in financial sector, which included capital markets, central 
bank and commercial banks. These measures, however, failed to produce any positive 
result as gross domestic savings and investment continue to remain extremely low. The 
government attempted on its own and on the behest of IMF and the World Bank to curtail 
public spending and improve revenue collection mechanism. Despite the assurances and 
securities provided, investor confidence did not improve given the continued political 
instability.  
In the later half of 1990s, another insidious problem emerged: non-performing 
loans of the private sector worsened. The banking and financial sector suffered loan 
defaults of about 7 percent of GDP in 1997 (Asian Development Outlook, 1998; p. 135).  
On the external sector, the country was facing three basic problems. One, remittance from 
nationals working abroad was declining; two, a reduction in demand for exports; and 
three, a huge allocation of funds for debt servicing. Foreign debt in 1999 stood at 
US$29.0 billion, which was 44.5 percent of GDP. Although, efforts were made to 
accelerate exports, but this sector remains sluggish, just got worse with decline of 2.7 
percent in 1997. 
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2.2 FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION IN 
PAKISTAN 
 
Financial liberalization is part of financial reform process and particularly refers 
to deregulation of interest rates. Financial deepening (M2/GDP ration), savings, 
investment and economic growth are indicators of its effectiveness. 
2.2.1 FINANCIAL DEEPENING 
 
Indicators of Financial and Capital Market Depth are listed in Table 2.  M3/GDP 
which was more or less stable until 2001 has slightly increased to around 56 percent in 
2002 and has been stagnant since then. It’s very low as compared to some other Asian 
economies such as Singapore (163 percent) or Korea (108 percent). 
The financial intermediation ratio shows that public sector is a major borrower in 
the credit market.  The ratio of public and private sector claims are almost the same, 
which is very different to those of East Asian countries, where private sector seems to be 
much active and efficient. Gross capital formation was almost stagnant until 2000 when it 
started declining.  The foreign direct investment improved significantly since 1993, 
though still very low as compared to some relatively developed countries in the region. 
The huge burden of fiscal deficits forces the government to involve in substantial 
borrowing activities. In periods, when foreign borrowing becomes difficult, the 
government has no option but to borrow domestically, thus leaving the total borrowing 
unchanged.  The numbers provided in Table 2.1 do not attest to any significant impact 
from liberalization.  This may be due to the fact that the liberalization process that was 
initiated in 1991 could not be continued until 1995 due to political instability.  
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Table 2.1: Indicators of Financial and Capital Market Depth in Pakistan 
(Percentage Annual Averages) 
 
 
Indicators 
 
1961
-70 
 
1971
-80 
 
1981
-90 
 
1991
-95 
 
1996
-
2000
 
2000
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
 
2005
-06 
Money Depth 
(M3/GDP) 
 
40.3 46.8 49.6 50.4 49.7 50.2 50.8 55.5 55.3
Intermediation 
Depth: 
 
         
  FIR (total)/GDP 
(=DC/GDP) 
 
38.4 45.5 51.2 52.7 50.6 49.6 45.5 42.3  
  FIR (Private)/GDP 
 
19.2 23.7 28.6 26.9 27.9 29.7 28.4 27.1 30.1
Capital 
Accumulation: 
 
         
    GCFC/GDP 
 
15.4 15.4 16.9 18.1 15.4 14.4 14.3 12.3  
    FDI (Net)/GDP 
 
- - 0.39 0.81 1.03 0.54 0.75 - - 
    FDI 
(Inflow)/GDP 
 
- - 0.38 0.81 1.01 0.53 0.69 - - 
Indebtedness: 
 
         
  Domestic 
Borrowing/GDP 
 
1.84 3.42 5.29 5.60 4.89 4.56 2.51 3.35 2.7 
  Foreign 
Borrowing/GDP 
 
3.34 3.74 1.45 2.06 2.03 0.91 2.20 1.27 1.53
Source: Ahmed M. Khalid (2006), .Economic Survey of Pakistan 
M2 = Currency + quasi money; M3 = M2 + Other Deposits; FIR = financial 
intermediation ratio; claims on public + private sector (total credit), on private sector 
(private); GFCF = Gross fixed capital formation; FDI=foreign direct investment (net); 
FDI (In): foreign direct investment (inflow). 
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Mickinnon-Shaw hypothesis suggests that financial liberalization, which 
advocates that the reasonably high and positive real interest rates in a liberal environment 
would induce large financial savings.  This would in turn increase credit supply to the 
firms and allows the firms to carry out positive net present value projects, which were 
previously constrained by credit availability in a financially repressed economy with, for 
example deposit interest rate ceiling (India and China being two good examples in the 
pre–1990s).  Increase in capital accumulation would lead to economic growth.  There is 
also an opposing effect on the investment.  The rise in real interest rate increases the cost 
of borrowing and decreases investment outlays.  Thus, strictly, the effect on growth may 
be ambiguous depending on which effect is dominant.  If economic growth is stimulated 
by financial liberalization due to the dominance of the credit effect, then a virtuous circle 
of higher savings, investment and growth would open up as savings out of current income 
rises when income increases.   
2.2.2 SAVINGS, INVESTMENT & GROWTH 
 
 Ahmed M. Khalid (2006) uses the data which is split into five groups to see the 
impact of liberalization on savings, investment and growth.  The five groups are, 1961-
2002 (the complete period); 1961-1980 (pre-liberalization period); 1961-1988 
(denationalization initiated); 1981-2002 (post-liberalization) and 1989-2002 (2nd phase of 
liberalization). The results of his findings are summarized as under: 
• In the pre-liberalization period (until 1988), total saving is only influenced by the 
real GDP and its own lag and the same is true for the complete sample (1961-
2002) as well.  Financial saving is measured by the difference between M3 and 
M1.  This basically includes relatively less liquid to highly illiquid assets.  The 
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results do not reflect any impact of liberalization policies on financial saving.  It is 
mainly determined by real income.  Any macroeconomic variable consistent with 
financial liberalization hypothesis, would have had some impact on financial 
saving is statistically insignificant.     
• The results suggest that the investment demand in Pakistan is determined by 
lagged real income, domestic credit and financial saving.  In the absence of a 
developed capital market for corporate bonds and equity, supply of domestic 
credit becomes dominant in fulfilling the demand for investment.  Real interest 
rate show statistical insignificant negative relationship with investment. 
• The results for the first sample (1961-2002) show that the growth is negatively 
related to government saving due to huge budget deficits (basically used to 
service debt) which erodes any resources available for real sector.  Capital flight 
is negatively related to economic growth and is consistent with the theoretical 
expectations.  The results are very much the same in all sample periods.  
Financial liberalization was pursued slowly in 1980’s, seriously in 1990’s and 
aggressively after 1999 by the present Govt. as a part of its financial reforms & 
development strategy to secure sustainable economic development and social 
development. These reform policies were first initiated in early 1980s (with 
denationalization) and then major steps were taken in 1990 to revamp the whole financial 
system.  It is unfortunate to note that these policies have not been successful and effective.  
In the light of literature (Chapter I), we can say that impact of financial liberalization is 
not significant in case of Pakistan as the prerequisites of macroeconomic stability, 
political stability and institutional preconditions are not met.   
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2.3 FINACIAL REFORMS & POLICY MEASURES 
BY THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT 
 
In May 1998, the country’s decision to retaliate to the Indian atomic explosion by 
their own nuclear explosion brought severe economic sanctions by the world. The result: 
by the end 1999, the country had exceptionally high level of debt with foreign exchange 
reserves enough for mere 3-months of imports. This economic mismanagement led to 
another military takeover in October 1999. In December 1999, the present Government 
formulated and started implementing policy to achieve macroeconomic stabilization 
through fundamental structural reforms and improved governance which they believed 
would lead to sustainable growth and poverty reduction. Following major measures were 
taken. 
2.3.1 DEBT RESTRUCTURING 
 
The first and foremost measure was to find a durable solution to the external debt 
problem as it was the major cause of stress to the economy. Major debt was owed to 
multilateral institutions and the bilateral official creditors with former unassailable and 
thus the focus was centered on the bilateral debt re-profiling. Pakistan was able to reach 
an agreement with the IMF on a three-year Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
(PRGF) of which the debt restructuring was an integral part. The success on the external 
debt front was absolutely essential for macroeconomic stability and prior to the approval 
of PRGF all the pre-requisites for obtaining debt re-profiling on a long term basis were 
fulfilled. 
2.3.2 FISCAL AND TAX REFORMS  
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The fiscal policy reforms and consolidation by raising tax revenues, reducing 
expenditures, cutting down subsidies of all kinds and containing the losses of public 
enterprises were also carried on concurrently with the debt restructuring. Tax reforms 
were undertaken to widen tax base, remove direct contact between tax payers and tax 
collectors, introduce value-added tax as the major source of revenue, simplify tax 
administration and strengthen the capacity of the Central Board of Revenue.  
2.3.3 PRIVATIZATION AND FINANCIAL SECTOR 
REFORMS  
 
The next major thrust of the reform program was to accelerate the process of 
privatization of state-owned enterprises which was initiated in 1991 under the Nawaz 
Sharif Government, continued under the Benazir Government because of an underlying 
philosophy that the Government should not be in the business of running businesses but 
regulating the markets and laying down policies. The Central Bank was granted 
autonomy and the control of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) over banking institutions 
was diluted. Excess labor was shed off through voluntary golden hand shake schemes 
(under which employees who opted for retirement were paid handsome amounts in 
addition to their regular emolument) and unprofitable branches were closed down. The 
voluntary golden hand shake schemes were introduced by the government whereby the 
employees were offered lump sum amount much greater than the normal pension if they 
voluntarily resign from their jobs.  
2.3.4 TRADE LIBERLIZATION AND FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT  
Trade liberalization has been undertaken in Pakistan for the last 15 years and the 
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maximum tariff rate which was as high as 250-300 percent has been brought down to 25 
percent while the average tariff rate is about 9 percent. Uniform rules and regulations 
have been implemented for both domestic and foreign industry to improve efficiency and 
compete in the world. The foreign investors can transfer their profits freely, raise funds 
from domestic sources, without any restrictions and are treated equally with national 
firms. Oil and gas, telecommunication and civil aviation sectors have also been 
deregulated. 
2.3.5 GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS  
The cornerstone of the governance agenda is the devolution plan which was put 
into effect in 2001 to transfer powers and responsibilities to elected local representatives, 
as opposed to bureaucrats sitting in provincial and federal capitals. Devolution of power 
will thus strengthen governance by increasing decentralization, transparency, 
accountability of administrative operations, and people’s participation in their local 
affairs. Other essential ingredients for improving economic governance are the separation 
of policy and regulatory functions, which were earlier combined within the ministry. 
Civil service reforms aimed at improving recruitment, training, performance management, 
career progression, right sizing of ministries and attached departments, and improving 
compensation for government employees are part of the second generation reforms of the 
government for building strong institutions in the country. The reforms in some of the 
most important federal institutions - the Central Board of Revenue (CBR), Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) and 
Pakistan Railways–were initiated by the government. Reforms in access to justice will 
deal with delays in the provision of justice, case management, automation, and court 
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formation systems. 
2.4 FINANCIAL REFORMS & POLICY 
OUTCOMES  
The financial and economic reforms initiated by the Government have brought 
about economic turn around if compared with the situation as was prevailing in 1998. 
Today Pakistan’s international credit rating is Ba2 – only three notches below investment 
Table 2.2 GDP & Sector Growth Rates  
INDICATORS 1960's 1970's 1980's 1990's 
2001-
03 
2004-
06 
  Average Annual 
Growth Rate (%) ( CONST fc)      
GDP 6.8 4.8 6.5 4.6 3.3 7.6
Agriculture 5.1 2.4 5.4 4.4 0.7 3.8
Manufacturing 9.9 5.5 8.2 4.8 6.9 11.7
Commodity Producing 
Sector 6.8 3.9 6.5 4.6 2.2 7.6
Services Sector 6.7 6.3 6.7 4.6 4.4 7.6
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 2006 
grade. Pakistan’s GDP growth rate has consistently averaged 7.6 percent during period 
2004-06 (Table 2.2), per capita incomes have shot up to almost US$850, the incidence of 
poverty has declined from 34 percent to 25 percent, unemployment rate has gone down to 
6.2 percent and the size of the economy has doubled to $130 billion.  
 
2.4.1 DEBT RESTRUCTURING  
 
External debt and liabilities as ratio of GDP has declined from almost 52 percent 
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to 28 percent and as a percentage of foreign exchange earnings down to 125 percent from 
almost 300 percent six years ago. The myth that Pakistan is highly dependent upon 
official foreign assistance and particularly that from U.S. can be gauged from the fact that 
less than 9 percent of country’s foreign exchange income is derived from official aid. 
Official Development Aid (ODA) per capita is only $8 or 1% of Gross National income. 
Forex reserves have risen from $1 billion in 1999-2000 to $13 billion in May 2006 
representing about 6 months of imports. 
2.4.2 FISCAL AND TAX REFORMS  
 
Although these reforms are still underway, the adoption of universal self 
assessment followed by random audit of selected tax returns, automation and 
reorganization of the tax machinery has begun to help improve tax collection although 
tax-GDP ratio has not yet improved to any significant extent. The total revenue came 
down to 14.1% during the period 2001-2006 from 17% in the 1990’s but total 
expenditure has also been brought down to 18.2% during the period 2001-03 and further 
reduced to 17.5% during 2004-06. This has resulted in reduction of overall deficit to 
3.3% during 2004-06 from around 7 % of GDP in the 1990s (Table2.3). 
2.4.3 PRIVATIZATION AND FINANCIAL SECTOR 
REFORMS  
 
Pakistan’s record on privatization has been impressive and this has helped in 
stopping the hemorrhaging of public finances and easing the pressures on fiscal deficit. 
Pakistan’s proceeds from privatization of banks, telecom, steel and other public 
enterprises were about $3 billion in the last few years. 
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Table 2.3 Fiscal Policy Indicators  
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 2006 
As a result of these reforms, the share of the private sector ownership of the 
banking assets has risen to 80 percent. The banks are highly profitable and the average 
lending rates had declined to as low as 5 percent as automation, on-line banking and 
multiple channels of delivery improved the efficiency of services and a healthy 
competitive environment set in. Agriculture credit, Small Medium Enterprises (SME) 
financing, consumer loans and micro credit have become mainstream products of the 
banking industry and the borrower base of the banking system has multiplied from 1 
million to 4 million households. Large scale manufacturing has grown in double digits 
and the cumulative private sector credit by banking system in last three years was more 
than $15 billion compared to less than $10 billion in the previous ten years. Market 
capitalization of the stock exchange has grown steadily and averaged 30% of GDP during 
2001-03 and 63.3% during 2004-06 as compared to 13.4 % during the 1990’s (Table2.4). 
INDICATORS 1960's 1970's 1980's 1990's
2001-
03 
2004-
06 
  Average Annual 
GROWTH RATE (%)        
FISCAL POLICY       
As % of GDP(Current MP)       
Total Revenue 13.1 16.8 17.3 17.1 14.1 14.1
Tax Revenue - - 13.8 13.4 11.0 10.5
Non-Tax Revenue              - - 3.5 3.7 3.1 3.3
Total Expenditure              11.6 21.5 24.9 24.1 18.2 17.5
 Current Expenditure             - - 17.6 19.4 15.9 13.4
 Defense             - - 6.5 5.6 3.3 3.2
Interest Payment - - 3.8 6.8 5.5 3.3
General Admn. - - 1.3 1.9 2.2 2.1
Development Expenditure - - 7.3 4.7 2.4 3.6
Overall Deficit 2.1 5.3 7.1 6.9 4.1 3.3
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Financial assets have grown by 70% over the past five years and by end-CY05 reached 
Rs 5.1 trillion, equivalent to 80% of GDP. Banking sector grew at a faster pace relative to 
non-bank sectors and currently accounts for 71% of the financial industry assets. There 
has been exceptional growth in the profitability and efficiency of the financial services 
industry.  
Table 2.4 Money & Credit and Stock Market  
INDICATORS 1960's 1970's 1980's 1990's 
2001-
03 
2004-
06 
  Average Annual 
GROWTH RATE (% of 
GDP)        
Monetary Assets(M2) 16.3 21 13.2 16.8 14.1 16.3 
Domestic Assets 15 20.5 15.4 12.2 2.1 19.0 
STOCK  MARKET (Growth 
Rates)       
General Index for Share 
Prices - - 0.1 4.1 21.9 36.6 
Aggregate Market 
Capitalization - - 2.5 13.4 30.0 63.3 
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 2006 
2.4.4 TRADE LIBERLIZATION AND FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT  
 
Trade – GDP ratio has reached 38 percent – one of the highest in South Asia 
region. Exports have doubled in U.S. dollar terms in last four years attaining a level of 
$18 billion. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows have been rising every year and 
amounted to more than $3 billion or 2.3 percent of GDP – the highest in South Asia. 
Private capital flows in form of workers’ remittances and other current transfers are 
touching $9 billion annually. On the external front, Pakistan successfully entered 
international capital markets in early 2004 and has received enthusiastic response every 
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year since then. Every single sovereign bond issue was oversubscribed several times and 
the pricing was better than that of investment grade countries. In 2006, Pakistan was able 
to raise more than $1 billion in 30 year and 10 year sovereign bonds in the U.S. market at 
fine pricing and these bonds were heavily oversubscribed. At the same time, outlays on 
public sector development expenditure tripled in this period, accelerating investment in 
infrastructure and human development.  
Table 2.5 Balance of Payments (Growth Rates %) 
INDICATORS 1960's 1970's 1980's 1990's 2001-03 2004-06
  Average Annual 
Private Transfers(net)   2.3 5.9 23.8 7.9 
Workers Remittances   1.9 -5.3 69.2 0.5 
As% of GDP(MP)       
Exports (FOB)   9.8 13 12.8 11.8 
Imports (FOB)   18.7 17.4 13.7 15.7 
Trade Deficit   8.9 4.4 0.9 3.9 
Current Account Deficit   3.9 4.5 2.1 1.2 
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 2006 
After a consistent reduction in macroeconomic imbalances over FY00-04, the fiscal and 
external current account deficits have been above the targeted levels for FY06 and are 
likely to remain in that range in FY07. Most notable is the concern regarding trade deficit 
which is around $8.2 billion in FY06. Around 45% of the increase in trade deficit for 
July-May FY06 over the comparable period in the preceding year is on account of the 
rise in import bill for crude oil and petroleum products, 39% due to higher imports of 
machinery, 11% because of iron and steel and 14.3% for food and fertilizers. 
2.4.5 GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS  
 
The role of effective accountability through regulatory agencies is very important 
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and pivotal in improving the quality of governance and quality of working in institutions. 
The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) has been functioning quite effectively for the 
last five years as the main anti-corruption agency. A large number of high government 
officials, politicians and businessmen have been sentenced to prison, subjected to heavy 
fines and disqualified from holding public office for twenty-one years on charges of 
corruption after conviction in the courts of law. Major loan and tax defaulters were also 
investigated, prosecuted and forced to repay their overdue loans and taxes. However, it 
will take some time so that the informal institutions take their place and start working 
efficiently along with the formal institutions. 
2.5 FINANCIAL REFORMS & POLICY 
EVALUATION  
Pakistan's economy had, until a few years ago, been characterized as unstable and 
highly vulnerable to external and internal shocks. However, the economy proved to be 
unexpectedly resilient in the face of multiple adverse events concentrated into a 2000-06 
period — 
• economic sanctions — according to Colin Powell, Pakistan was "sanctioned to the 
eyeballs";  
• global recession;  
• severe rioting in the port city of Karachi;  
• a severe drought — the worst in Pakistan's history, lasting four years;  
• heightened perceptions of risk as a result of military tensions with India — with 
as many as a million troops on the border, and predictions of impending 
(potentially nuclear) war;  
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• the post-9/11 military action in neighboring Afghanistan, with a massive influx of 
refugees from that country;  
Despite these adverse events, Pakistan's economy kept growing, and economic 
growth accelerated towards the end of this period. This resilience has led to a change in 
perceptions of the economy, with leading international institutions such as the IMF, 
World Bank, and the ADB praising Pakistan's performance in the face of adversity. 
Pakistan's economic outlook has brightened in recent years in conjunction with rapid 
economic growth and a dramatic improvement in its foreign exchange position as a result 
of its current account surplus and a consequent rapid growth in hard currency reserves. In 
the last decade of the twentieth century, Pakistan had experienced severe fiscal 
imbalances — its debt had grown rapidly during the 1990s. Nuclear tests in May 1998 
triggered the imposition of economic sanctions by the G-7, and in early 1999 Pakistan 
narrowly averted defaulting on its debt. Although the country had been receiving IMF 
assistance, the government had difficulty meeting the conditionality of the IMF program, 
which was suspended in July 1999 and resumed later during the administration of 
General Pervez Musharraf. Having improved its finances, Pakistan's government 
announced in 2004 that it would no longer require IMF assistance, and the assistance 
program ended in that year. Economic agenda of the Government continues to include 
measures to widen the tax net, privatize public sector assets, and improve its balance of 
trade. Pakistan has made governance reforms, privatization, and deregulation the 
cornerstones of its economic revival. In the first four years of the twenty-first century, 
Pakistan's KSE 100 Index was the best-performing stock market index in the world as 
declared by the international magazine “Business Week”.  
 34
Table2.6a Social Development Indicators 
INDICATORS 1960's 1970's 1980's 1990's 
2001-
03 
2004-
06 
  Average Annual 
Education       
Expenditure as % of GNP   0.8 2.3 1.7 2.1
Literacy Rate     Percent   29.5 40.7 50.4 53.0
Male   39 51.6  65.0
Female   18.7 28.6  40.0
Health       
Registered Doctors (000 Nos.) 2 6.3 28.1 68.9 96.6 113.2
Hospitals( Numbers) 380 521 651 823 896.3 913.7
Exp on Health as % of GNP  0.6 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 2006 
Table 2.6b Human Resource Indicators  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 006 
  Although the Govt. has received appreciation from International Financial 
Institutions for its financial and reforms and improved the economic situation 
significantly as compared what it was in 1999, yet there are number of concerns. The 
country has yet not strong industrial base & infrastructure and lacks far behind than other 
countries on the technology frontiers. The World Bank considers Pakistan a low-income 
INDICATORS 1980's 1990's
2001-
03 
2004-
06 
Population Average Annual 
Population( Million) 96.3 124.6 144.4 152.5 
Labor Force(Million) 11.6 35.1 42.1 45.5 
Employed Labor Force(Million) 11.2 33.1 39.1 42.0 
Un-employed Labor Force(Million) 0.4 2 4.5 3.6 
Un-employment Rate(% per annum) 1.4 5.7 7.2 7.5 
Crude Birth Rate Per 1000    18.7 27.1 
Crude Death Rate Per 1000   5.4 8.1 
Infant Mortality Rate Per 1000    56.0 80.7 
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country, although it is recorded as a "Medium Development Country" on the Human 
Development Index 2005 and its rank on UN Human Development Index is 134th in 2006. 
The level of corruption is quite high as indicated by the corruption perception index rank 
i.e., 142nd in 2006. The expenditure on education and health has been around 2% and 
0.7 % (Table2.6a) respectively through 1990’s till now. 
Resultantly still the social development and human development indicators are very low.  
Low allocation of resources to socio-economic development or infrastructure projects has 
resulted in inadequate provision of social services and very high birth rates in the past 
have contributed to a persistence of poverty which is still around 25% reduced from 
32.1 % in 2000-01. The rural poverty has declined from 39 percent to 31.8 percent and 
urban poverty from 22.7 percent to 17.1 percent. Pakistan has a family-income Gini index 
of 41, close to the world average of 39.On measures of income inequality, the country 
ranks slightly better than the median.  
2.6 CONCLUSION 
Pakistan has political and economic history of 60 years characterized by political 
and economic instability. Five times military has taken over and ruled for 32 years, the 
remaining 28 years, government has been in hand of politicians with almost 20 prime 
ministers. Apart from this Pakistan’s economy has been hit by two wars with India, 
Afghan War, Gulf War and Involvement in War against terror.  
Financial and economic reforms have been pursued by various governments but 
due to political inconsistency they have not been implemented in letter and spirit. 
Financial liberalization does not show any significant impact on economy due to absence 
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of political and macroeconomic stability preconditions and most importantly the 
institutional preconditions.  
Present Govt. (backed by military general) has also initiated various financial & 
economic reforms and continued financial liberalization under the guidance from IMF 
and World Bank. It has been able to bring about some macroeconomic stability duly 
appreciated by international financial institutions. Although the present govt. has also 
introduced institutional and regulatory reforms in order to strengthen the institutions but 
firstly the Military President and secondly the recent Judiciary Crises (whereby the 
President ousted the Chief Justice of Supreme Court) clearly show institutional weakness 
both formal and informal.        
Pakistan is a developing country with weak industrial base, underdeveloped 
infrastructure and not very promising social and human development indicators. The 
Govt. may continue to pursue financial liberalization and reforms under guidance/ 
pressure from international institutions but it has to play dynamic and proactive role in 
order to join the developed nations.   
 
 
Chapter 3  
3 EVOLUTION OF KOREAN 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM  
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The economy of South Korea is one of the largest economies in the world. It 
ranks 10th in the world and is Asia's 3rd largest economy according to GDP measured by 
nominal, as of 2006. Just after the Korean War, South Korea was one of the poorest 
countries in the world—yet, today South Korea is one of the richest nation in the world: 
Per capita gross national product, only $89 in 1962, exceeded $16,000 in 2005( Table 
3.1). Korea has been cited as one of successful countries with relatively low income 
inequality and rapid growth. Gini index 0.35 & per capita growth rate 7.25 from 1965-
1990. Absolute poverty declined steeply from 48% in 1961 to less than 10% entering 
1980s. South Korea had the fastest growing economy in the world's history during mid 
and late 20th century, advancing at double-digit figures; this unbelievable economic 
development is often referred to as the "Miracle of the Han River". 
The core of the South Korean economy has changed substantially over the 
country's six-decade existence. In the 1940s, the country was predominantly agricultural, 
with little industry. The emphasis shifted to light industry and consumer products in the 
following decades and then to heavy industry in the 1970s and 1980s. In the first three 
decades after the Park Chung Hee government launched the First Five-Year Economic 
Development Plan in 1962, the South Korean economy grew enormously and the 
economic structure was radically transformed.  
Table 3.1 Bird’s Eye View of Korean Economy (1962-2005) 
 Economic Development 1962 1992 1997 2005 
Per Capita GDP $89 
(101st)
$7,527 $11,176 $16,291 
(29th) 
Investment (% of GDP) 13.8 37.3 36.0 30.1 
 38
Exports (% of GDP)   5.1 26.6 32.4 42.5 
Imports (% of GDP) 16.8 27.7 33.0 40.0 
Social Development   
Life expectancy at birth 55 72 74 77 
Infant mortality rate(per 1000 births) 90 8 5.8 - 
Water Service Rate (%) 18.2 79.0 85.1 - 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Years School   5.7    7.6   9.5 10.6 
High school enrollment ratio (%) 28.1  63.5 88.0 96.4 
Tertiary school enrollment ratio (%)   8.4  15.9 37.7 80.5 
Source: Lecture Slides (Evolution of Korean Financial System) 
The rapid economic growth of the late 1980s was boosted by the 1988's Olympics 
in Seoul. The economy rapidly became mature during the 1990s and the exponential 
growth rate finally started to slow down to a still-robust approximate 6.5 percent as 
wages of Korean workers increased at the same rate. Much of the labor intensive 
industries moved away to neighboring countries such as China, Vietnam and Indonesia. 
As in other developed countries, the service sector has become increasingly dominant 
since the 1990s; it now comprises about two-thirds of the GDP. South Korea became a 
member of the OECD in 1996, joining the 'League of the Richest Nations in the World'. 
The economy was further boosted later in the 2002 World Cup, hosted by South Korea 
and Japan. 
At the start of the 21st century, South Korea aimed to become the world's leading IT 
nation. In just 5 years Korean IT products & services captured leading market shares in 
the world and today, companies like Samsung leave all competition behind, including the 
Japanese Sony and American Microsoft, controlling key sectors of the IT industry such as 
semiconductors and still advancing at a very fast rate to-date. 
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South Korea has a very promising, futuristic economy and is one of the 'Next Eleven' 
economies and also one of the fastest developing mature economies: At its current speed, 
South Korea's economy is going to be in the same class as the United Kingdom and 
France by 2025. Many other sectors of the economy is planned to be created or extended, 
including the Financial, Biotechnology, Aerospace and Entertainment Industries. 
3.1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Following the Japanese occupation and the Korean War, the Syngman Rhee 
administration of the newly formed South Korean state used foreign aid from the United 
States during the 1950s to build an infrastructure that included a nationwide network of 
primary & secondary schools, modern roads, and a modern communications network. 
The result was that by 1961, South Korea had a well-educated young work force and a 
modern infrastructure that provided a solid foundation for economic growth. 
3.1.1 BEGINNING IN THE 1960s 
South Korea's real gross national product expanded by an average of more than 8 
percent per year, from US$3.3 billion in 1962 to US$204 billion in 1989. Per capita 
annual income grew from US$87 in 1962 to US$4,830 in 1989. The manufacturing sector 
grew from 14.3 percent of the GNP in 1962 to 30.3 percent in 1987. Commodity trade 
volume rose from US$480 million in 1962 to a projected US$127.9 billion in 1990. The 
ratio of domestic savings to GNP grew from 3.3 percent in 1962 to 35.8 percent in 
1989.The most significant factor in rapid industrialization was the adoption of an 
outward-looking strategy in the early 1960s because of South Korea's poor natural 
resource endowment, low savings rate, and tiny domestic market. This strategy promoted 
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economic growth through labor-intensive manufactured exports, in which South Korea 
could develop a competitive advantage. Government initiatives played an important role 
in this process. The inflow of foreign capital was greatly encouraged to supplement the 
shortage of domestic savings. These efforts enabled South Korea to achieve rapid growth 
in exports and subsequent increases in income. By emphasizing the industrial sector, 
Seoul's export-oriented development strategy left the rural sector relatively 
underdeveloped. Increasing income disparity between the industrial and agricultural 
sectors became a serious problem by the 1970s and remained a problem, despite 
government efforts to raise farm income and improve living standards in rural areas. 
3.1.2 SHIFT TO CAPITAL-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES 
Up to early 1970s the industrial structure had been based on low value-added and 
labor-intensive products, which faced increasing competition and protectionism from 
other developing countries. The government responded to this problem in the mid-1970s 
by emphasizing the development of heavy and chemical industries and by promoting 
investment in high value-added, capital-intensive industries which included iron and steel, 
transport machinery, household electronics, shipbuilding, and petrochemicals. The 
developers of heavy and chemical industries sought to supply new industries with raw 
materials and capital goods and to reduce or even eliminate dependence on foreign 
capital. New (and critical) industries were to be constructed in the southern part of the 
peninsula, far from the border with North Korea, thus encouraging economic 
development and industrialization outside the Seoul area and providing new employment 
opportunities for residents of the less developed areas. As a result, heavy and chemical 
industries grew by an impressive 51.8 percent in 1981; their exports increased to 45.3 
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percent of total output. These developments can be ascribed to a favorable turn in the 
export performance of iron, steel, and shipbuilding, which occurred because high-quality, 
low-cost products could be produced in South Korea. By contrast, the heavy and 
chemical industries of advanced countries slumped during the late 1970s. In the 
machinery industries, investments were doubled in electric power generation, integrated 
machinery, diesel engines, and heavy construction equipment; the increase clearly 
showed that the industries benefited from the government's generous financial assistance 
program. The structural transition to high value-added, capital intensive industries was 
difficult. Moreover, it occurred at the end of the 1970s, a time when the industrial world 
was experiencing a prolonged recession following the second oil price shock of the 
decade and protectionism was resulting in a reduction of South Korean exports. By 1980 
the South Korean economy had entered a period of temporary decline: negative growth 
was recorded for the first time since 1962, inflation had soared, and the balance-of-
payments position had deteriorated significantly. 
3.1.3 STABILITY TO CRISES 
In the early 1980s, Seoul instituted wide-ranging structural reforms. In order to 
control inflation, a conservative monetary policy and tight fiscal measures were adopted. 
Growth of the money supply was reduced from the 30 percent level of the 1970s to 15 
percent. Seoul even froze its budget for a short while. Government intervention in the 
economy was greatly reduced and policies on imports and foreign investment were 
liberalized to promote competition. To reduce the imbalance between rural and urban 
sectors, Seoul expanded investments in public projects, such as roads and 
communications facilities, while further promoting farm mechanization. The Fifth Five-
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Year Economic and Social Development Plan (1982-86) sought to shift the emphasis 
away from heavy and chemical industries, to technology-intensive industries, such as 
precision machinery, electronics (televisions, videocassette recorders, and 
semiconductor-related products), and information. More attention was to be devoted to 
building high-technology products in greater demand on the world market. The Sixth 
Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan (1987-91) to a large extent continued 
to emphasize the goals of the previous plan. The government intended to accelerate 
import liberalization and to remove various types of restrictions and non-tariff barriers on 
imports. These moves were designed to mitigate adverse effects, such as monetary 
expansion and delays in industrial structural adjustment, which can arise because of a 
large surplus of funds. Seoul pledged to continue phasing out direct assistance to specific 
industries and instead to expand manpower training and research and development in all 
industries, especially the small and medium-sized firms that had not received much 
government attention previously. Seoul hoped to accelerate the development of science 
and technology by raising the ratio of research and development investment from 2.4 
percent of the GNP to over 3 percent by 1991.These measures, coupled with significant 
improvements in the world economy, helped the South Korean economy regain its lost 
momentum in the late 1980s. South Korea achieved an average of 9.2 percent real growth 
between 1982 and 1987 and 12.5 percent between 1986 and 1988. The double digit 
inflation of the 1970s was brought under control. Wholesale price inflation averaged 2.1 
percent per year from 1980 through 1988; consumer prices increased by an average of 4.7 
percent annually. Seoul achieved its first significant surplus in its balance of payments in 
1986 and recorded a US$7.7 billion and a US$11.4 billion surplus in 1987 and 1988 
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respectively. This development permitted South Korea to begin reducing its level of 
foreign debt. The trade surplus for 1989, however, was only US$4.6 billion dollars, and a 
small negative balance was projected for 1990.In the late 1980s, the domestic market 
became an increasing source of economic growth. Domestic demand for automobiles and 
other indigenously manufactured goods soared because South Korean consumers, whose 
savings had been buoyed by double-digit wage increases each year since 1987 and whose 
average wages in 1990 were about 50 percent above what they had been at the end of 
1986, had the wherewithal to purchase luxury items for the first time. The result was a 
gradual reorientation of the economy from a heavy reliance on exports toward greater 
emphasis on meeting the needs of the country's nearly 43 million people. The shifts in 
demand and supply indicated that economic restructuring was underway, that is, domestic 
consumption was rising as net foreign demand was falling. On the supply side, the greater 
growth in services mirrored what the people wanted--more goods, especially imports, and 
many more services. 
By 1990 there was evidence that the high growth rates of the late 1980s would 
slow during the early 1990s. In 1989 real growth was only 6.5 percent. One reason for 
this development was the economic restructuring that began in the late 1980s--including 
the slower growth of major export industries that were no longer competitive on the 
world market (for example, footwear) and the expansion of those industries that were 
competitive, such as electronics.  
From the 1960’s to 1980’s Korea had a relationship based Institutional arrangement 
among the govt., banks, and the chaebols: i.e. Quasi-Internal Organization, which 
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according to Chung H. Lee (1992) can be more effective than policy implementation 
through the market due to the sharing of information and economies in transaction costs. 
However, process of financial liberalization was initiated in slowly in early 1980 and 
accelerated in early 1990 as step towards the market based economy but it lead to 
corporate sector failures and ultimately 1997-98 financial crises.   
3.2 FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION, CRISIS AND 
REVIVAL IN KOREA  
 
The financial liberalization in the early 1980s was undertaken as one of the menu 
for comprehensive stabilization program prepared by the Chun Doo-Hwan government. 
The comprehensive stabilization program included reduction in govt.’s deficit, tight 
monetary policy, wages control, trade liberalization, relaxing control over foreign 
investment, privatization of banks, and phasing out the subsidies to HCIs. These 
programs were designed by the newly empowered liberal economists in Korea, notably 
Kim Jae Ik, a Stanford Ph.D.  
3.2.1  FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION   
 
In 1981, MOF selected Hanil Bank for privatization among the 5 banks which 
was completed in June 1981. Two major chaebols including Samsung acquired the 
controlling shares, raising questions on imposing an upper limit on the share a single 
company or individual could own.  Little progress had been made until May 1982, when 
Chang Yong-Ja scandal involving four commercial banks broke out which coupled with 
mounting NPLs due to increases in insolvent debt-ridden firms in some industries amid 
world-wide recession after the 2nd Oil shock created a dead lock. Minister of Finance, 
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Kang Kyung-Sik, came to occupy the upper echelons of the MOF, and resumed the 
privatization of three commercial banks, Korea First Bank and the Bank of Seoul and 
Trust Company in 1982 and the Chohung Bank in 1983. In Dec. 1982, the National 
Assembly passed an amendment to the General Banking Act. A ceiling of 8% was 
imposed on individual ownership of nationwide commercial banks. This restriction was 
further strengthened as the ceiling was lowered to 4% in 1994 in line with the progress in 
financial liberalization. As of the end of 1996, the combined shares of those who own 
more than 1% of the total voting stocks of nationwide banks accounted for 39.3% on 
average. Also, among large shareholders top 30 chaebols were predominant. Despite the 
bank ownership structure comparable to that of advanced countries, large shareholders of 
most banks had remained passive in exercising their voting rights and monitoring bank 
management. Government intervention in the appointment of CEOs of banks had 
prevented bank management from pursuing shareholders’ interests. Indeed, the board of 
directors of banks had not been in a position to check the management in an independent 
manner. 
Some barriers to entry into the financial industry were lowered and financial 
services provided by different intermediaries (both of banking and NBFIs) were 
diversified and streamlined. The curb market incident (Chang’s scandal) in 1982 had 
made MOF to lower entry barriers to the NBFIs.  As a result, number of NBFIs such as 
investment and finance companies and mutual savings and finance companies, increased 
conspicuously. Within a year, 12 new short-term finance companies and 57 mutual 
savings and finance companies were chartered. Unlike bank, NBFIs were free of 
ownership restrictions except life insurance companies and investment trust companies. 
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As the role of NBFIs continued to increase, the influence of chaebol on them did as well. 
In order to free interest rates and discontinue policy loans, the interest rate gap between 
policy loans and ordinary bank loans was almost completely eliminated in 1982. Despite 
the fact that the freeing interest rates constitute an integral part of financial liberalization, 
little progress had been made. The fundamental reason for this delay was that Korea’s 
business, particularly chaebols, was highly leveraged, with high interest costs. Interest 
rate surge after deregulation was policymaker's major concern. It was only 1991 that a 
more extensive interest rate deregulation began to be undertaken on a step by step basis. 
All lending rates except the SME loans and most deposit rates except demand deposits 
were deregulated.  
There were two more major constraints on Financial Liberalization. Financial 
liberalization was set back in the course of industrial rationalization and the bail-out 
period in the 1980s. The govt. involved in a large-scale restructuring of firms facing 
financial difficulties, because of overexpansion of the HCI in the 1970s and the collapse 
of foreign markets in overseas construction and shipping in the early 1980s. The Govt.-
led bail-out policy forced banks to assume large NPLs as creditor banks were directed to 
reschedule or write-off debts incurred by troubled firms, and to provide additional 
financial resources as “seed” money. At the end of 1988, bank loans to firms designated 
for rationalization amounted to 7.3 trillion won, 12.6% of total bank loans. To mitigate 
the financial burden of the banks involved, the Bank of Korea delivered 1.7 trillion won 
of special credit, carrying a low interest rate of 3% per annum. Another major constraint 
to financial liberalization was the expansion of credit support to formerly unfavored 
sectors, such as SMEs. The govt. tightened the required ratio of SME loans out of banks' 
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total loans (SME required ratio: 45%). In particular, political democratization since 1987 
spurred social demand for social equity, which forced the govt. to further assist the SME 
sector. At the same time, credit control system for chaebols was intensified to ease the 
concentration of bank loans. In 1987, the basket control of credit system (credit ceilings) 
was introduced to limit the shares of bank loans to the 30 largest chaebols SMEs received 
an increasing share of commercial banks while chaebols received decreasing shares. As 
for NBFIs, chaebols’ share of lending increased from 32.4% in 1988 to 38.4% in 1995. 
Given that the aggregate market share of NBFIs was increasing rapidly, the increasing 
share of chaebols in NBFI loans implied a substantial volume of credit was intermediated 
to chaebols through this alternative source. 
Capital market opening to international flows had also been gradually implemented. 
The opening of the security markets allowed indirect investment ahead of direct 
investment in Korean securities by foreigners. In 1981 domestic investment trust 
companies (ITCs) began to issue matching funds to foreign investors. In 1984, the Korea 
Fund, designed for transactions of domestic securities by foreign investment companies, 
was established at New York. The Korea Euro Fund was created to serve the European 
market in 1987. Korea Asia Fund was established in 1990. Beginning in 1985, domestic 
firms were permitted to issue convertible bond (CB) in international financial market. 
When the current account surplus stimulated an increase in the domestic money supply 
during 1986-89, the govt. relaxed controls on capital outflows. Deregulation of capital 
outflows enabled domestic financial institutions to invest in foreign securities. The govt. 
even allowed such transactions as overseas real estate investments, which had hitherto 
been regarded as proscribed practice. On the other hand, the fear of massive capital 
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inflows, attracted by anticipated won appreciation, prompted the authorities to tighten its 
control on capital inflows. For instance, foreign bank loans were substantially curtailed, 
while foreign commercial loans to the private sector were prohibited. When current 
account swung back into deficit in early 1990s, the govt. restarted the deregulation of 
capital inflows. In 1992, foreigners were allowed to directly purchase the Korean stocks, 
with the maximum foreign ownership of a company set at 10%. Along with the opening 
of the securities markets, foreign direct investment (FDI) was also deregulated. Until 
early 1980s, Korea had relied mainly on foreign borrowing rather than on FDI as its 
financing strategy. In 1984, restrictions on FDI were relaxed in recognition of the FDI’s 
role in promoting competition and transferring advanced foreign technologies. A 
negative-list system for FDI was introduced with abolition of restrictions on the foreign 
ownership ratio and the repatriation of capital. By the late 1980s, the manufacturing 
sector was almost completely open to FDI. At the end of 1989, all but 10 of 522 
categories of manufacturing activity were open to FDI. Nevertheless, FDI’s share in 
Korea’s total fixed investment registered a mere 0.3%, on average, in 1981-91, much 
smaller than 1.9% in the 1960s and 2.0% in the 1970s. Financial liberalization since early 
1980s had reduced the differentials in access to credit between the export and domestic 
firms, the HCI and light industries, the large firms and SMEs, and the producers and 
consumers. In late 1980s, NBFI’s share in total deposits began to surpass that of banks, 
and peaked at the onset of the financial crisis, accounting for more than 70% of total 
deposits. This rapid growth of NBFIs was due to fewer regulations with respect to 
interest rates and policy loans than the commercial banks. Ownership restrictions on 
NBFIs have been lifted in the process of financial liberalization since the late 1980s.  As 
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a result, many NBFIs have been owned or actually controlled by chaebols. Although 
many NBFIs are owned by chaebols, government’s financial supervision has been almost 
absent until the onset of the crisis.  
3.2.2 FINANCIAL CRISIS 1997-98 & ITS CAUSES 
Corporate sector insolvency was the key factor behind 1997-98 financial crises. 
Decreasing trend in profitability combined with increasing trend in debt exposure since 
the late 1980s resulted in weak debt servicing capacity. Korean firm’s financial 
vulnerability was not a temporary but structural phenomenon in nature. Since the late 
1980s, profit performance of firms deteriorated except for the semiconductor companies 
affiliated with the top 5 chaebols. Debt leverage rose for all firms and the ratio for the 
chaebols were systemically higher than that for non-chaebol firms. IPCR for the Korean 
corporate sector was on a downward trend for almost a decade prior to the crisis. There 
were already signs of financial trouble in both corporate and financial sectors: large 
potential NPL held by the financial institutions. However, according to the official NPL 
data, not only NPL ratio recorded at low level but it had also been decreasing until 1996. 
These findings imply that there existed substantial "false demand for credits". Financial 
institutions simply rolled over of what were essentially bad loans, "Evergreen" 
accounting problem. The marginal productivity of capital declined from 35% in the 
1960s to 25% in the early 1970s and less than 10% on the eve of the crisis. Rising labor 
costs, combined with the emergence of low-cost exporters such as China weakened 
Korea’s international competitiveness, especially labor-intensive, low technology 
industries and lead to declining profitability in Korean firms. Korea has not been able to 
compensate for this loss in competitiveness with a sufficiently rapid gain in 
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competitiveness in technology-intensive sectors due to its weak capability to innovate 
and adopt advanced technologies. Labor costs had persistently risen in excess of 
productivity gains since the mid-1980s. China increased its export share in the U.S. from  
1.2% in 1985 to 7.3% in 1997, while Korea’s share dropped from 4.6% in 1988 to 2.6% 
in 1997. Korean manufacturing (except high-tech) sector experienced a decreasing trend 
in profitability since the late 1980s. 
In short declining marginal productivity of capital, further expansion of Chaebols’ 
investment, heavy corporate debt leverage, decreasing trend in profitability, labor market 
rigidity and increasing competition from China resulted in increased Corporate Failures 
which coupled with deteriorated financial soundness due to reckless Financial 
Liberalization & Lax Financial Supervision lead to massive capital outflow and denied 
rollover of Short-term external debt and hence a crises situation. 
3.2.3 FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION – AN ANALYSIS 
 
In Korea, financial liberalization began in the early 1980s in a piecemeal manner 
and without a coherent strategy. However, its pace was accelerated during the Kim 
Young Sam administration (1993–98). The government relaxed or abolished many of the 
financial market restrictions and foreign exchange transactions to internationalize the 
Korean economy (& join OECD). Despite widespread interest based support by various 
groups there was, however, no clear consensus on the understanding and implementation 
process of financial liberalization. Consequent upon this opaque situation and 
disagreement among various domestic and foreign interest groups, it was not a prudent 
strategy for a new financial system. By 1997, the practice of direct intervention in credit 
allocation and government management of commercial banks had been completely 
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eliminated but it also weakened the “government-chaebol-bank co-insurance” scheme 
that had worked well in bringing about rapid economic development in Korea. At the 
same time, typical corporate firms in Korea were highly indebted, and in the case of some 
chaebol firms the leverage ratio even reached close to 500. It was not possible for any 
single financial institution to impose the necessary debt discipline on the large chaebols, 
and there was misconception that they would not be allowed to go bankrupt by the 
government which was not in any way conducive to creating a sound banking or credit 
culture in Korea.  
Yoon Je Cho argues that structural problems should have been tackled before 
Korea began its financial liberalization and he highlights that before the crisis many 
influential observers in Korea believed financial liberalization to be an automatic solution 
to many of the structural problems and establishing an efficient financial system.  
Korea’s financial crisis of 1997–98 was, in Cho’s own words, a “natural consequence of 
the financial liberalization that had been carried out in an economy with a highly 
leveraged corporate sector, poorly developed financial market infrastructure, inadequate 
corporate governance, and a poor credit culture.” He argues that since reforming the real 
sector is a difficult, time-consuming process Korea should have undertaken financial 
liberalization in a gradual manner in pace with reforms in the corporate sector and the 
regulatory regime. It is, however, doubtful that this strategy would have been any easier 
to implement. According to Rajan & Zingales, the two systems (i.e. relationship based 
system and arm’s length market based system) that are essentially incompatible with each 
other came into contact, arm’s length capital to relationship based system without 
protection to financer and no price signals to deploy massive inflow of capital that 
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resulted in crisis situation.   
3.2.4 REVIVAL AND POST CRISES REFORMS   
 
Korea made quickest recovery from the crises among the affected countries. It 
was aided by a rescue package of 40 billion US$ from the IMF and restructuring under its 
guidance.  During the restructuring process following the crisis, a number of insolvent 
financial institutions failed or merged with other institutions. The government-led 
restructuring effort reduced the amount of NPLs held by financial institutions. The 
financial soundness and profitability of the industry, particularly banking sector, have 
improved dramatically. After the crisis, the share of banking sector in total assets 
expanded, thanks to financial security offered by deposit insurance scheme. Firms 
focused on strengthening their financial soundness through the reduction of borrowing 
Korean firms’ debt-equity ratio is even lower than those of advanced countries. 
Consumer loans by financial institutions expanded rapidly after the financial crisis. 
Financial institutions have focused on expanding in home financing market. 
   In the aftermath of 1997 crisis, Korea undertook a number of reforms in financial 
supervision. It created the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) and the Financial 
Supervisory Service (FSS). FSC (state agency) was created to function as an integrated 
supervisory agency for all types of financial institutions and markets, while FSS was 
established to act as an executive arm of FSC and FSS is a private corporation in the form 
of a special legal entity operating in the public domain. Although FSC and FSS are 
formally separate, the two agencies are supposed and expected to operate as a single 
supervisory authority. Under this new system of integrated financial supervision, 
FSC/FSS is the sole supervisory agency for banks and NBFIs, formerly the charges of 
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BOK and the MOFE, respectively. However, the chronology of events show that under 
lax supervision, credit card companies extended credits without assessing credit 
information such as income which they could not have if they had been properly 
supervised by the appropriate supervisory agencies, i.e. public agencies such as MOFE, 
FSC/FSS and BOK failed in their role as supervisory agencies, during the period 1999-
2003. World Bank (Financial Sector Assessment Korea, June 2003 pp. 6-7) reports: 
 
“Despite notable progress in prudential supervision, concerns remain about the 
regulator’s ability to supervise certain risks in an integrated, coherent manner 
and to respond to new challenges” 
 
IMF (Republic of Korea: Financial system Stability –Assessment, March 2003, p. 24) 
 
“Prudential regulators lack the unfettered right to issue new regulations when 
they perceive a need to do so.” 
 
The prudential problems relating to credit card companies and household debt were 
a failure of an institutional structure, due to interdependency of formal institutions (laws 
& statutes) and informal institutions (conventions and social norms), in which MOFE 
dominated other public agencies, making it difficult for them to carry out their statutory 
responsibilities when their doing so went against MOFE’s achieving its own policy 
objectives. The post-crisis reform in financial supervision in Korea was largely limited to 
changing formal institutions for financial supervision and that further reforms will have 
to be undertaken in other related institutions if Korea is to improve its financial 
supervision. 
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3.3 CONCLUSION 
Korea has become widely known for achieving rapid economic growth. Major 
contributing factors for shared growth were: Growth with job-creation, initially led by 
labor intensive export promotion, broad access to education and raising technical know-
how, leadership – vision sharing between government and private sector, political 
stability and promoting spirit of self-help (Saemaul movement and workfare). However, 
reckless financial liberalization and wide scale corporate failures led to economic crisis 
during 1997-1998. Although financial liberalization was correct policy as it was initiated 
in slowly through 1980’s  as Korea had strong base for economic takeoff but a coherent 
strategy for institutional and regulatory measures for corporate restructuring and to 
replace the government’s role and support in a relationship based system were missing 
while heading towards the market based system. In response to the crisis, Korea 
implemented one of the most comprehensively designed liberalization and market-
oriented reform measures to strengthen the economic fundamentals. Korea has made 
major progress in financial and corporate sector reform: the supervisory and regulatory 
regime for the financial sector has been substantially strengthened, and recent reforms 
have helped achieve a high degree of observance of international standards and codes. 
Korea’s macroeconomic performance since the crisis has been impressive, with strong 
real growth, low inflation, and rapidly growing official foreign reserves. But these 
circumstances also permitted a delay in some important reform measures—including, for 
example, addressing issues in the area of insurance and securities, the adoption of the 
insolvency framework, and the completion of corporate restructuring—as the fast 
recovery made these steps appear less urgent and left the reform agenda unfinished. The 
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completion of such reforms is crucial, since otherwise an economic downturn could 
unveil important weakness. 
Although, Korea has recovered quickly from the Asian Crisis through assistance of 
IMF and its own economic policies but the case of credit card companies shows the 
failure of the institutional structure and structural holes in the system and we can say that 
institutional pre conditions are yet not fulfilled and expose the vulnerability of the 
financial system. The interdependency of the financial institutions, both formal (laws and 
statutes) and informal (social norms and culture), is the main reason for institutional 
failure.  There is need for prudent, proactive and dynamic approach on behalf of the 
Korean Government to be successful and avoid and future crisis.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
4 COMPARISON AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The history of freedom of the two countries dates back to the mid 1940’s. Korea 
got liberated from the Japanese rule in 1945 while Pakistan came into being as result of 
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partition of the subcontinent in 1947. At the time of creation both the countries had 
dismal conditions; however their progress has been altogether different. Korea has joined 
the group of developed countries through its economic will and planning whereas 
Pakistan is still a developing country struggling for political and economic stability and 
prosperity.    
4.1 COMPARISON OF ECONOMY 
 
South Korea's economy is one of the developed economies in the world and ranked 
10th by volume at nominal 2006 whereas Pakistan is a developing country and it 
economy is much smaller in comparison as the GDP (PPP) of the two countries is $439 
billion (2006) and $1.18 trillion (2006 est.) respectively. Brief comparison of the 
economies of two countries is given in Table 4.1. At the time of their independence the 
economies of both the countries were dominated by agriculture but today Korea’s 
economy is a developed one dominated by industry and services sector contributing 
40.3% and 56.3% in the GDP while Pakistan economy is under developed with industrial 
and services sectors contributing 25.1% and 53.3% respectively. The Korean industrial 
sector dominated by the high-tech industry while it’s negligible in case of Pakistan. The 
export and import volume of the two countries clearly depicts that Korea has trade 
surplus while Pakistan has trade deficit which resultantly affects current account 
positively in case of Korea and negatively in case of Pakistan. 
The foreign reserves of Pakistan are US$13 billion much better than what they 
were in 1999 but are almost 1/16th of Korean foreign exchange reserves. This difference 
is because of the strength in the Korean high-tech export industries/companies like 
Samsung, LG, Hyundai, etc., which compete at the international level and are among the 
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best in the world.  
Although the two countries have same income distribution levels and relatively low 
income inequality with Korea having record of Gini index 0.35 & per capita growth rate 
7.25 from 1965-1990 and Pakistan having a family-income Gini index of 41, close to the 
world average of 39. But Korea is rich nation with per capita income of $16291 (2005) 
and estimated absolute poverty of 2% (2006) whereas Pakistan is a low income and poor 
nation with per capita income of $847 (2005) and absolute poverty of 23 % (2006). 
Inflation and the unemployment rate in Pakistan (6% & 6.6% respectively) is almost 
double than Korea (2.8% & 3.4% respectively).  
Korea has skilled labor force of 23 million (50% of the population) with 93% 
belonging to industrial and services sector where Pakistan has mostly unskilled labor 
force of 48 million (30 % of population) with 44.8 % belonging to agricultural & allied 
sectors and the remaining 55.2% to the industrial and services sectors. 
 
 
 
Table 4.1 Comparison of Economy of Pakistan & Korea 
 PAKISTAN  KOREA 
GDP RANKING  10th by volume (at 
nominal) (2006) 
GDP (PPP) $439 billion (2006) $1.18 trillion (2006 est.) 
GDP growth 6.9% (2006 est.) 5.1% (2006 est.) 
GDP per capita $847 (2005)  $16291 (2005) 
GDP by sector Agriculture: 21.6% 
industry: 25.1% services: 
53.3% (2006 est.)  
Agriculture (3.3%), industry 
(40.3%), services (56.3%) 
(2005 est.) 
Inflation 6%(2005 est.) 2.8% (2005 est.) 
Labor force 48.29 million 23.53 million (2005 est.) 
Labor force by Agriculture, forestry, Agriculture (6%), industry 
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occupation hunting & fishing (44.8%), 
Manufacturing (13.6%), 
Construction, Transport, 
storage & telecom (11.7%), 
Wholesale & Retail trade 
(14.1%),Community, social 
& personal services& others 
(15.8%) (2005-6 est.) 
(26%), services (67%) 
(2004 est.) 
Unemployment Rate 6.6% (estimated 2006) 3.4%(estimated 2006) 
Population below 
poverty line 
23 %( estimated 2006) 2%(estimated 2006) 
Main industries Automotive ,textiles, 
chemicals, food processing, 
steel, transport equipment, 
machinery, beverages, 
construction, materials, 
clothing, paper products. 
electronics, automobile 
production, chemicals, 
shipbuilding, steel, textiles, 
clothing, footwear, food 
processing 
Exports $19.24 billion (2006 est.) $288.2 billion (2005) 
Main Export Partners United States 22.4%, UAE 
8.3%, UK 6%, China 5.4%, 
Germany 4.7% (2006 est.) 
China 21.8%, U.S. 
14.6%, Japan 7.8%, Hong 
Kong 4.2% (2005) 
Imports $28.58 billion  
 
$256 billion (2005) 
Reserves of foreign 
exchange 
$ 13 billion ( 2006) $210.4 billion (2005) 
Source: Internet www.answers.com , Economic Survey of Pakistan (2006), Lecture 
Slides Evolution Korean Financial System 
     
    
These differences are reflected in the overall position of the economies of the two 
countries. Korea is today a developed economy competing world level and holding a 
leading position among Asia's developed economies. It is also expected to lead the world 
in penetrating Japan's trade barriers.  On the contrary Pakistan is a developing country 
with a small and under developed economy and highly vulnerable to political instability.  
4.2 COMPARISON-FINANCIAL 
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LIBERALIZATION 
 
There are many things that can be learnt from the analysis of financial liberalization 
policies as implemented in these two countries. When the process of financial 
liberalization as it took place in Korea and Pakistan is analyzed although it is clear that 
the basic objective in both cases was the same, i.e. the economic uplift of the country, yet 
the intensity of problems and existing circumstances in two countries varied to a large 
extent. Before the introduction of financial liberalization, economic condition of Pakistan 
was very bad and Pakistan was at the verge of default (chapter 2, section 2.3) where as 
Korea had strong economic platform (chapter 3, section 3.2.1) and in a much better 
condition than Pakistan.  
In Korea at the beginning of introduction of market based system in 1980s the per 
capita income was approximately 2000 US $ whereas in Pakistan still the per capita 
income is only around 850 US $. Further in Korea only 10% people were below the 
poverty line as compared to Pakistan where 34% of the population was below the poverty 
line which according to the latest official figures given by government of Pakistan has 
been brought down to a value of 25%.  
When the policies of financial liberalization were in the offering in Pakistan, it 
lacked many essential infrastructure such as developed industrial sector in all essential 
fields of engineering and technology and has not even now developed to a satisfactory 
level but Korea had strong infrastructure and industrial base and had all the essential 
industrial sectors well developed in 1980s.  
There is acute lack of skilled human resources in Pakistan, according to a survey of 
the year 2003/04 by an unofficial body, out of total labor force of 30.41%, only 4.88% is 
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working in technology/engineering assisted jobs and 50.8% of labor force works in 
agricultural, fishery and other manual labor industries in contrary to Korea where these 
short comings were not there. Therefore for successful implementation of the policies 
Pakistan needs to pay urgent attention towards skilled labor, education, research and 
development, and establishing framework where local and foreign investors can launch 
joint projects. Just to cite one example where financial liberalization is successfully being 
implemented at proper pace is that of China where 500,000 foreign companies and 
approximately 5000 research and development cells are working.   
In case of Korea, it was a correct policy but the pace of liberalization was not in 
step with the establishment of regulatory institutions and the policies were not 
implemented in whole and therefore it had to face the financial crisis at the end of 90s. 
This crisis therefore was not the result of wrong policies but was the result of partial 
implementation due to local and foreign pressures and faster than suitable pace because at 
that time Korea wanted to join OECD. As far the case Pakistan is concerned, it 
implemented economic and financial reforms under conditional help from IMF and 
continued financial liberalization despite the fact that it lacks prerequisites of political 
stability, macroeconomic stability and strong formal & informal institutions. Although 
the reforms have given positive results and macro economic growth indicators are 
improving and the there is more need to focus on strengthening the weak technology base, 
basic infrastructure, health, education and institutional reforms. That requires common 
vision and collaboration among various key players.  
There are other significant differences or similarities between Korea and Pakistan 
which played an important role directly or indirectly in the process of financial 
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liberalization. Some of these are as follows:- 
• Political Stability: - In 60 years of independence of Pakistan, for 30 years, it 
has been ruled by Military and the civilian rule too saw much turmoil 
because of intervention by the Military. This did not let the basic condition 
to prevail necessary for investment and implementation of economic 
process whereas South Korea did not go through such long spells of 
political instability. 
• Pakistan had not been very sovereign and independent in forming many 
political and economic policies because of its strategic location and a path 
to access rich oil resources along the Caspian Sea. South Korea on the other 
hand had partially similar conditions because of North Korea threat. 
• Lack of Land Reforms: - Pakistan was not successful in implementing land 
reforms whereby land could be distributed to those who cultivate. Because 
of influential land lords who possessed huge lands, it was not possible to 
cultivate the land in an optimum manner. This led to not an impressive 
performance in agriculture centre, moreover these land lords also interfered 
in other affairs of the state through their political positions. 
• High level of corruption and inaccessibility to the opportunities by the 
public without discrimination is also one of the major causes which did not 
let the financial liberalization policies to produce the effect, it aimed. South  
Korea had a much better position in this regard. 
• English as an official language: - In Pakistan English is official language of 
the state, so all the correspondence and state affairs are carried out in 
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English. With a very low literacy rate there are not more than 10% people 
who can communicate well in English. Therefore in all major economic 
reform programs especially those implemented by UN, World Bank and 
IMF, the public participation is negligibly small. In universities also, the 
medium of instruction is English. On the contrary, South Korea has strong 
programs in their own language.       
4.3 CONCLUSIONS  
 
Financial sector liberalization has been followed widely since 1973 and almost all 
developing countries have now at least partially liberalized their financial sector. The 
process has varied greatly; both in terms of speed and sequencing, yielding positive 
results in terms of greater financial depth and increased investment efficiency but it has 
not bought the boost in the savings. It also suggests that a modest positive real interest 
rate would be not only most conducive to secure a high rate of saving but also an 
optimum from the view point of avoiding financial crisis. Financial liberalization needs 
to have macroeconomic & institutional preconditions and needs to be adjusted according 
to the institutions and culture of the country for its success. Ultimate goal of any reform 
is to ensure economic stability and then sustainable economic growth. Although market 
based financial system can do it most efficiently, but that is the case only when there are 
no market failures which is inherent characteristic of markets so financial liberalization 
needs to be carried out with a coherent strategy to guard against the market failures which 
replace the Governments’ role against the market failures.  
Thus, before any country decides to undertake financial liberalization, it must 
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ensure if it is correct policy for it to adopt in lieu of its economic, social, cultural and 
institutional conditions and if so, it must be carried out prudently according to the policy 
blueprint and in proper sequenced manner. 
Pakistan has history is characterized with political and economic instability along 
with that Pakistan’s economy has been hit by two wars with India, Afghan War, Gulf 
War and Involvement in War against terror. Financial and economic reforms have been 
pursued by various governments but due to political inconsistency they have not been 
implemented in letter and spirit and studies show that financial liberalization does not 
have any significant impact on economy due to absence of political and macroeconomic 
stability preconditions and most importantly the institutional preconditions. The Present 
Govt. of General Pervaiz through its various financial, economic reforms and 
liberalization policies has brought about some macroeconomic stability duly appreciated 
by international financial institutions. Although the present govt. has also introduced 
institutional and regulatory reforms in order to strengthen the institutions but firstly the 
Military President and secondly the recent Judiciary Crises (whereby the President ousted 
the Chief Justice of Supreme Court) clearly show institutional weakness both formal and 
informal. Pakistan is a developing country and weak industrial base, underdeveloped 
infrastructure and not very promising social and human development indicators. The 
Govt. may continue to pursue financial liberalization and reforms under guidance/ 
pressure from international institutions but it has to play dynamic and proactive role in 
order to join the developed nations.   
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Korea achieved rapid economic growth through job-creation, initially led by labor 
intensive export promotion, broad access to education and raising technical know-how, 
leadership – vision sharing between government and private sector, political stability and 
promoting spirit of self-help. Although financial liberalization was correct policy but was 
carried out recklessly without coherent strategy for institutional and regulatory measures 
for corporate restructuring and to replace the government’s role and support in a 
relationship based system were missing while heading towards the market based system 
resulting in corporate failures and 1997-98 financial crises. Korea implemented one of 
the most comprehensively designed liberalization and market-oriented reform measures 
to strengthen the economic fundamentals after the crises and has made major progress in 
financial and corporate sector reform: the supervisory and regulatory regime for the 
financial sector has been substantially strengthened, and recent reforms have helped 
achieve a high degree of observance of international standards and codes impressively 
improving macroeconomic performance, with strong real growth, low inflation, and 
rapidly growing official foreign reserves. But these circumstances also permitted a delay 
in some important reform measures as the fast recovery made these steps appear less 
urgent and left the reform agenda unfinished. The completion of such reforms is crucial, 
since otherwise an economic downturn could unveil important weakness. Despite having 
recovered quickly from the Asian Crisis through assistance of IMF and its own economic 
policies still there are but there institutional weaknesses and structural holes as evident 
from the case of credit card companies. We can say that institutional pre conditions are 
yet not fulfilled and expose the vulnerability of the financial system. The 
interdependency of the financial institutions, both formal (laws and statutes) and informal 
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(social norms and culture), is the main reason for institutional failure. There is need for 
prudent, proactive and dynamic approach on behalf of the Korean Government to be 
successful and avoid and future crisis.       
Financial liberalization for implementation of market based system has been 
critically analyzed and it has been discussed in the context of Pakistan and Korea. It has 
been concluded that financial liberalization should be implemented keeping in view the 
social, economical and political structure of the country and before its launch, the 
placement of institutions, regulatory framework and infrastructural development must be 
ensured. The policy must be implemented in whole and governments should not budge to 
local or foreign pressures. A comparison of its enforcement in Pakistan and Korea 
showed that Pakistan lacked in many social, economic and political factors such as 
literacy rate, skilled human resources, per capita income, incessant democratic 
governments and its image as a stable, safe country for investment as compared to Korea. 
The policy of market based system can bring economic uplift to the country provided the 
prerequisites for its implementation are fulfilled which take time. Pakistan is facing many 
difficult challenges and will continue to face new unforeseen challenges. There is no 
room for complacency. One fourth of the population still lives below the poverty line. 
Human Development Indicators remain low as almost half of the population is illiterate, 
infant and maternal mortality rates are high, access to quality education and health care 
particularly by the poor is limited, income and regional inequalities are widespread, 
infrastructure shortages and deficiencies persist, skill shortages are taking a toll in the 
economy’s productivity while at the same time, there is high unemployment and 
underemployment. The worldwide preoccupation with the large economies of China and 
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India and the ever-increasing quest to enter these markets is also working to the 
disadvantage of countries such as Pakistan. But the lesson we have learned is that there is 
no point in complaining and whining about this but to get on with the job, to work even 
harder, to overcome these deficiencies and constraints and to hope for the best. 
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